The domestic politics of corporate accountability legislation: struggles over the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act by LeBaron, G & Rühmkorf, A.
This is a repository copy of The domestic politics of corporate accountability legislation: 
struggles over the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/122653/
Version: Published Version
Article:
LeBaron, G orcid.org/0000-0003-0083-6126 and Rühmkorf, A. (2017) The domestic 
politics of corporate accountability legislation: struggles over the 2015 UK Modern Slavery 
Act. Socio-Economic Review. ISSN 1475-1461 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwx047
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial (CC BY-NC) 
licence. This licence allows you to remix, tweak, and build upon this work non-commercially, and any new 
works must also acknowledge the authors and be non-commercial. You don’t have to license any derivative 
works on the same terms. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Article
The domestic politics of corporate
accountability legislation: struggles over
the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act
Genevieve LeBaron* and Andreas Ru¨hmkorf
University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
*Correspondence: g.lebaron@sheffield.ac.uk
Abstract
Over the last decade, the norm of corporate accountability for labour standards in
global supply chains has become increasingly prominent within the transnational
governance arena. As global governance initiatives to spur due diligence for labour
standards and combat exploitation in global supply chains—especially its most
severe forms frequently described as modern slavery—have proliferated, societal
coalitions have pressured states to pass domestic legislation to the same effect. In
this article, we examine the regulatory processes that spurred the passage of one
piece of anti-slavery legislation, the UK’s 2015 Modern Slavery Act. Our findings cor-
roborate a number of established expectations regarding business opposition
towards new legislation to raise public labour standards, but also provide a clearer
picture of the mechanisms through which industry actors impact policymaking proc-
esses. Paradoxically, such mechanisms include business actors’ championing of
weak regulatory initiatives, CSR activity and partnering with civil society organiza-
tions. Understanding industry actors’ use of these strategies improves our under-
standing of how transnational norms of corporate accountability and anti-slavery
are being contested and shaped at domestic scales.
Key words: governance, corporate social responsibility, government, social movements, firms,
law
JEL classification: K2 regulation and business law, D64 altruism, philanthropy, J8 labour stand-
ards: national and international
1. Introduction
Nearly 200 years after the UK abolished slavery, the practice continues to thrive both in the
UK and around the world. Today, over 21 million people are subjected to forced labour,
which the International Labour Organization (ILO) defines as ‘all work or service which is
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exacted under the menace of any penalty for its non-performance and for which the worker
does not offer himself voluntarily’ (International Labour Organization, 1930). The ILO defi-
nition of forced labour encompasses practices frequently referred to as modern slavery,
including slavery and human trafficking.1 The ILO estimates that total illegal profits made
annually from forced labour exceed US$150 billion, with the majority of victims concen-
trated in agriculture, manufacturing, mining, construction and domestic work (2014, p. 17).
The UK government estimates there are between 10 000 and13 000 victims of modern slav-
ery per year within its borders (UK Home Office, 2014a). Although scholars often write
about slavery as a phenomenon successfully relegated to the past, in reality it is a stable and
predictable feature of the global political economy, including the supply chains that create
buildings, garments, palm oil, sugar, seafood, tea, footwear, electronics and metals (Allain
et al., 2013; Crane, 2013; Phillips, 2013; ILO, 2014; Verite´, 2015).
As awareness and concern about these practices has grown among consumers, activists,
investors and policymakers, calls for corporations to take on greater accountability for
labour standards in their supply chains have intensified. Bolstered by shaken confidence in
market self-regulation in the wake of multiple crises of corporate accountability
(Kinderman, 2015), new transnational regulatory initiatives have emerged to spur corporate
transparency and due diligence practices in global supply chains, including the 2011 United
Nations (UN) Guiding Principles (UN Human Rights Council, 2011) for Business and
Human Rights and revised OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Dozens of
states have recently passed legislation to stimulate corporate accountability for labour stand-
ards in global supply chains. One recent study found that 55 new pieces of national legisla-
tion imposing mandatory requirements onto companies to disclose information about
labour issues in their supply chains have been passed since 2009 (Phillips et al., 2016).
Examples include the UK’s 2015 Modern Slavery Act, California’s 2012 Transparency in
Supply Chains Act and France’s 2017 Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law.
Policymakers, industry actors and large swathes of anti-slavery activists have heralded
this wave of legislation as a game-changer for the eradication of modern slavery and are
optimistic that it will close regulatory gaps surrounding social practices in global supply
chains. The sense among scholars seems to be that at best, corporate accountability legisla-
tion constitutes a paradigm shift in global corporate and supply chain governance (Ruggie
and Sherman, 2015; Lake et al., 2016) and, at worst, it may contain deficiencies but is still a
very significant step forward for raising labour standards in global supply chains since it is
‘hard law’ with the positive potential to strengthen corporate social responsibility efforts
(Gond et al., 2011).
In our view, these conceptions of corporate accountability legislation are overly optimis-
tic and depend on the mostly inaccurate perception that this body of legislation has mean-
ingfully bolstered public labour standards. In reality, corporate accountability laws vary
hugely in their institutional design and levels of stringency, and many laws—in spite of their
purported aim of strengthening corporate accountability—do little more than create statu-
tory endorsements for existing private governance initiatives to address labour abuse, such
as certification schemes and private auditing. Domestic corporate accountability laws exist
on a spectrum. At one end are strong laws that mandate companies to develop a due dili-
gence plan on human rights in their supply chain, to disclose this plan and to implement it.
1 See Allain (2008) for overview of legal definitions of these terms and how they relate to each other.
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At the other end are weak laws that merely provide statutory endorsement to existing volun-
tary CSR initiatives and reporting, with no penalty for non-compliance. Most recent legisla-
tion falls towards the weaker end of the spectrum. Variation across corporate accountability
legislation is important because differences in quality and stringency of labour standards
governance initiatives strongly shapes their effectiveness (Fransen, 2012a; LeBaron and
Ru¨hmkorf, 2017). Two questions thus become urgent and important. The first is why some
national legislation takes such a weak form. The second is how these weaknesses impact
governance effectiveness. In other words, at stake in academic and policy discussions is
whether or not this wave of legislation will succeed in closing the regulatory gaps surround-
ing forced labour in global supply chains, and if not, who or what is responsible for its
deficiencies.
In this article, we investigate these questions by exploring variation in domestic corporate
accountability legislation and the consequences posed for the governance of labour stand-
ards in global supply chains. Our focus is on why—given that the impetus behind these laws
was to spur changes in business practices—some corporate accountability laws contain only
vague and weak requirements and do little more than create statutory references to existing
forms of industry-led private governance. To shed light into these dynamics, we investigate
the influences on quality and stringency of corporate accountability legislation in domestic
policymaking processes through an in depth qualitative case study of one prominent piece of
legislation, the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act.
Conceptually, our aim is to deepen understandings of the influences on national regula-
tion, and especially, of the mechanisms through which industry actors impact public initia-
tives to address labour standards in global supply chains. In line with extant studies
(Bartley, 2011; Taylor, 2011; Cutler, 2012), we find that private labour governance is being
used as a substitute for state regulation as businesses oppose and weaken new public stand-
ards (Kinderman, 2016) and strategically use CSR to deflect regulation (Kaplan, 2015). In
contrast to accounts that see CSR as a pragmatic and politically neutral strategy to fill gover-
nance gaps created by an inability or unwillingness on the part of states to regulate (Vogel,
2005), we stress the political agency of industry actors in mobilizing private initiatives as
part of a broader political strategy to displace and weaken new public legislation.
We move the field forward by providing one of the first in-depth studies of the complex
mechanisms through which private displacement of public regulation occurs. We note that
business opposition to regulation does not simply take the form of corporate political action
(CPA) against regulation. Paradoxically, in the case of the UK Modern Slavery Act, industry
actors sought to derail efforts to raise public labour standards by lobbying for legislation—
albeit a weak version of transparency legislation—and by positioning themselves as part of
the societal coalition pushing for government action to combat slavery in global supply
chains. Although the political dimensions of CSR and private regulatory initiatives have
been acknowledged in the CPA literature (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Fryna and Stephens,
2015) and recent scholarship on CSR (Kaplan, 2015), we argue that there is a need for
greater attention to the political agency of business in debates about public and private regu-
latory interactions. There is also a need for better recognition of the diverse mechanisms that
industry actors use to weaken and oppose public regulation. To date, the vast majority of
attention paid to industry efforts to influence policymaking has focused on their interactions
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with government, with civil society frequently assumed to be on the opposite side of the bar-
gaining table from industry in relation to labour governance. However, our analysis high-
lights the need for deeper investigation of the role of strategic partnership and collaboration
between industry actors and NGOs in shaping policy responses. In short, we seek to advance
the literature by providing a clearer picture of the mechanisms through which industry
actors impact domestic policymaking processes, and by developing an analytic perspective
that enables future research into variation across domestic legislation to strengthen corpo-
rate transparency and accountability.
In documenting the diverse strategies that powerful business actors use to influence pub-
lic labour standards bargaining processes, we challenge prevailing assumptions about the
transmission of transnational norms to the national sphere (Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore
and Sikkink, 1998), arguing that the diffusion of evolving transnational anti-slavery and
corporate accountability norms is not automatic but rather is contested and shaped at
domestic scales and can be trumped by the power of economic interests. Although the trans-
mission of anti-slavery norms is often thought to have occurred in the 19th century, we
argue that norm diffusion is ongoing and in our case study was undercut and diluted by
powerful industry interests. By unearthing key obstacles posed to corporate accountability
norm diffusion, we help to explain the considerable variation that exists across national
legislation with similar purposes, as well as the ongoing presence of forced labour in global
supply chains.
Empirically, we investigate the recent wave of national legislation to bolster corporate
accountability for labour standards, with a focus on anti-slavery legislation passed in
advanced capitalist countries over the last decade. We present an in-depth case study of
the making of the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act, beginning in 2010. Our data encom-
passes multiple documentary sources, including 157 evidence statements submitted to
Parliament by private actors during the policymaking phase, documentary evidence
about lobbying activities and 20 in-depth interviews with experts on forced labour who
had been involved in the UK policy process. We analyse how interactions between indus-
try actors, NGOs and policymakers in the creation of the UK Modern Slavery Act
impacted the stringency of this new legislation, and consequences for the Act’s effective-
ness. Our article proceeds in seven parts. Section 2 positions our study within debates
about public and private labour governance interactions and relates our approach to
existing perspectives in the literature. Section 3 provides an overview of new transna-
tional and national governance initiatives to address forced labour in global supply
chains, and describes the bifurcation between recent public and private initiatives.
Turning to the UK case, Section 4 introduces our methodology. Section 5 describes the
various regulatory initiatives that were initially proposed to eradicate forced labour from
supply chains in the UK context and analyses the legal consequences that these initiatives
would have had for UK companies and multinational enterprises. Section 6 analyses the
role of business-led programs and industry actors in shaping the regulatory outcome, and
the use of CSR as a strategy to deflect more stringent legislation, with particular attention
to variation across industry responses. A final section of the article concludes there is a
need to investigate further the role of private actors in reinforcing national and transna-
tional governance gaps surrounding forced labour.
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2. Theory: understanding industry influences on national
anti-slavery policymaking
Over the last two decades, there has been a proliferation of private initiatives to promote
labour standards in global supply chains, such as through corporate codes of conduct, certif-
ication schemes and ethical auditing programs (Cutler, 2012; Fransen, 2012a; Locke, 2013).
These schemes, designed and implemented by firms often in collaboration with NGOs, have
flourished alongside growing concern about the prevalence and endurance of labour exploi-
tation—including forced labour and modern slavery—within global supply chains, and espe-
cially in relation to those chains feeding high-end consumer markets in advanced capitalist
countries.
Alongside the proliferation of private initiatives, societal coalitions (Vogel, 1997) have
put pressure on states to pass new legislation to strengthen corporate accountability and
liability for labour standards, especially worker health and safety, wages, union rights and
the use of child and forced labour. Such coalitions have targeted both transnational organi-
zations such as the ILO, OECD and World Trade Organization, and national and sub-
national governments, and have often coalesced around demands for stronger and more
global regulation of corporate activities to protect the world’s workers from a corporate
‘race to the bottom’ in labour standards. In advanced capitalist countries, societal coalitions
have pressured governments to raise domestic labour standards and the enforcement of
those standards in relation to wages, working conditions and collective bargaining rights,
and have also put pressure on governments to pass legislation that would spur corporate
responsibility for forced labour within global supply chains.
Recently, as scholars have debated the interactions between CSR and public regulation
more broadly (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010; Brammer et al., 2012; Kinderman, 2012;
Fransen and Burgoon, 2017), they have begun to explore how public and private initiatives
to govern labour standards interact, and whether, when, and under what conditions private
initiatives compliment or undermine traditional forms of state regulation. One vein of schol-
arship has argued that public and private initiatives are complimentary (Gjolberg, 2009).
Studies have documented a ‘California effect’ wherein public regulation can help to ‘ratchet
up’ private standards, and private standards can fill gaps where state capacity falls short
(Vogel, 1997; Bernstein and Cashore, 2007; Cashore et al., 2007; Cashore and Stone,
2014). Researchers within this perspective have concluded that public legislation to raise
labour standards strengthen private initiatives, that private coalitions and initiatives can
strengthen government enforcement of labour law (Posthuma and Bignami, 2014) and that
a combination of public and private initiatives is required to govern labour standards in sup-
ply chains (Weil, 2005; Bartley, 2011).
Another vein of scholarship, however, has challenged the notion that businesses will har-
moniously fill in gaps in public regulation, and have raised concerns that private labour ini-
tiatives are increasingly becoming a substitute for public labour standards regulation and
enforcement (Cutler, 2012; Mayer and Phillips, 2017). Recent studies have drawn attention
to the political value of private governance initiatives, and particularly their role in uphold-
ing the status quo of insufficient governance and supporting industry actors’ claims that new
forms of public labour standards and enforcement are unnecessary (O’Rourke, 2003;
Esbenshade, 2004; Kaplan, 2015; LeBaron and Lister, 2015). Studies have also documented
business opposition to new public legislation across several jurisdictions. Kinderman (2016),
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for instance, has argued that the notion of a ‘smart mix’ of complimentary regulation is
overly optimistic, demonstrating that industry actors tend to reject and oppose new state-
based regulations, favouring instead voluntarism and soft law without hard sanctions.
Debates about private and public labour regulatory interactions are at an early stage and
remain limited both empirically and theoretically (Fransen and Burgoon, 2017). Research
confirming that private regulation is displacing public regulation has been especially modest.
To date, there have been few in-depth studies of the circumstances under which substitu-
tion or displacement of private regulation for public regulation occurs, the mechanisms
through which industry actors impact and alter public governance initiatives, or the dynam-
ics through which CSR emerges as a substitute for public regulation. Extensive comparative
research will be required to achieve a better understanding of these dynamics, and such
efforts are essential if we are to understand the obstacles to effective governance of global
supply chains.
This article seeks to push forward the debate about the circumstances under which
private labour regulation comes to substitute for public regulation by providing a clearer
picture of the mechanisms through which industry actors impact policymaking processes,
focusing on an in-depth case study of the bargaining processes that led to the UK Modern
Slavery Act. We highlight the role of industry actors in influencing and derailing the societal
coalition that sought to strengthen public regulation of labour standards, and document
how public labour governance was displaced and weakened through the mobilization of pri-
vate regulatory power and initiatives. While a comprehensive theorization of how, when
and why private actors influence the design of public regulation lies is beyond the scope of
this article, in the remainder of this section, we seek to move debates forward by challenging
prevailing assumptions about how private displacement of public regulation takes place,
and by arguing that greater attention needs to be paid to the diverse strategies and mecha-
nisms that industry actors use to influence and displace public regulation.
2.1 Industry influences on public labour standards
To date, discussions of industry actors’ influence over public labour standards have focused
overwhelmingly on their opposition to it, such as through lobbying, legal action and financ-
ing of political rivals. Indeed, the tendency of industry actors to seek to influence public reg-
ulation by opposing and frustrating new regulation that would restrict or alter their business
models has been well documented across several academic literatures, ranging from the crit-
ical political economy literatures on finance and outsourcing to organizational studies litera-
ture on CPA2 (cf. Cutler et al., 1999; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Soederberg, 2007; Mattli and
Woods, 2009; Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Taylor, 2011). In the contemporary global econ-
omy, however, although businesses efforts to influence regulation often still takes the form
of straightforward opposition, industry actors’ efforts to derail public regulation to raise
labour standards are also carried out through more indirect and less confrontational mecha-
nisms. Paradoxically, rather than opposing new legislation, industry efforts to influence
legislation can take the form of strategic support and advocacy efforts in favour of weak
and hybridized forms of state regulation. In addition, industry actors also use a variety of
strategies to steer societal coalitions away from stringent public governance and towards pri-
vate industry-led solutions. These efforts need to be considered and studied alongside and in
2 Thanks to Gregory Jackson for suggesting this connection to the CPA literature.
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addition to industry actors’ more traditional political strategies to influence and oppose new
regulation.
As we document below, although industry actors might have been reasonably expected
to oppose the UK Modern Slavery Act since its impetus was to increase industry responsibil-
ities to prevent and address forced labour in global supply chains, in fact, several powerful
business actors mobilized in support of the legislation and worked alongside civil society
coalitions to champion it. At first glance, this is puzzling. Why would powerful business
actors support and lobby for regulation that would impose new corporate responsibilities
for the governance of labour standards in global supply chains? Shouldn’t we expect them
to favour voluntarism and resist any form of government intervention, as they have been
well-documented to do within the literature? The seeming paradox of industry support for
being regulated is resolved, however, when the stringency of the legislation is examined in
greater detail. As we argue below, the version of the Modern Slavery Act that industry actors
championed reinforced and heightened the legitimacy of existing private, voluntary ‘anti-
slavery’ initiatives. At the beginning of the bargaining process, the government was consider-
ing an array of governance initiatives of varied levels of stringency, ranging from new crimi-
nal liabilities for companies found to have forced labour in their supply chains, to
mandatory reporting on the effectiveness of corporate efforts to prevent and address forced
labour, the least stringent initiative was ultimately adopted. As we argue below, for complex
reasons including a desire to harmonize regulatory requirements across multiple jurisdic-
tions, in the case of the Modern Slavery Act industry activity to displace and weaken strin-
gent legislation took the form of lobbying for rather than against anti-slavery legislation.
Industry actors also sought to influence legislation by pushing to create and legitimize
business-driven programs during the early stages of the legislative bargaining process and by
involving NGOs in business-led anti-slavery initiatives. Ultimately, we argue, although the
impetus behind the Modern Slavery Act was to strengthen corporate accountability for
labour standards in global supply chains, private actors influenced the bargaining process
such that the Act merely incorporated—rather than strengthened or challenged—industry-
led approaches to detecting and addressing severe labour exploitation. Thus, while ulti-
mately industry actors sought to substitute private standards for stringent forms of public
regulation, the mechanisms through which they accomplished this were far more subtle and
complex than the adversarial strategies that have received the bulk of the attention within
the labour governance literature to date.
Recent management studies literatures on the political nature of CSR help to shed light
into industry strategies to creatively defend its power through ‘softer’ and more subtle efforts
to deflect restrictions on their business practices (Kaplan, 2015). As Kaplan has argued,
companies have long used indirect strategies to protect the status quo, including the strategic
mobilization of CSR to offset mandatory regulation. Through such efforts, he demonstrates,
corporate elites have achieved ‘institutional maintenance’ which allows them to defend their
powerful market positions and stave off efforts to restrict and change the rules of global pro-
duction (2015). Similarly, the CPA literature has emphasized the political value of CSR as a
corporate political strategy to ‘shape government policy in ways favourable to the firm’
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999; see also Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Lawton et al., 2013; Fryna
and Stephens, 2015). For instance, Hond et al. (2014) have recently documented industry’s
use of CSR as a political strategy to secure favourable political conditions for business.
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Building on these literature’s insights about the political role and value of CSR, and the
need to pay attention to industry actors’ variegated strategies to exert political influence—
which include softer and more sophisticated strategies like CSR—we argue that industry
efforts to negatively influence the stringency of public legislation are not limited to straight-
forward opposition and attempts to frustrate regulatory initiatives. Rather, they also include
more subtle forms of influence, such as the championing of private initiatives as well as
efforts to steer societal coalition to bolster labour standards away from stringent regulation.
To use the CPA literature’s terminology, in our case, the strategic use of CSR comprised
both a form of political CSR and a form of CPA used by firms to shape government policy.
A crucial and often overlooked part of the story of how private governance comes to sub-
stitute for public governance lies in industry interactions with NGOs. To date, accounts of
industry actors’ political agency have focused overwhelmingly on business efforts to influ-
ence government. However, in addition to and as part of their efforts to influence policy-
makers, industry efforts to influence public legislation also encompass their interactions
with NGOs. This has been well documented by Dauvergne and LeBaron (2014) who argue
that partnerships between industry actors and civil society organizations are helping to for-
tify the power of corporations to influence their own governance and the rules of global pro-
duction more broadly. Particularly in the area of transnational labour governance, alongside
recent civil society calls for greater corporate accountability, industry actors have sought to
strategically connect to civil society groups and to position themselves as the solution to
problems like forced labour and human trafficking in supply chains, rather than the cause of
such problems. The role of industry–NGO partnerships in displacing stringent global supply
chain governance has been under investigated in the literature. Although NGOs have fea-
tured prominently within the regulatory governance literature as stakeholder groups and co-
regulators (Gereffi et al., 2001; Bartley, 2007), industry actors’ efforts to steer societal coali-
tions away from public regulatory options and towards private regulation have received
very little attention.
In this article, we document industry efforts to influence public regulation through strate-
gic engagement with civil society coalition pushing for stronger public governance of labour
standards, as well as a range of other sophisticated and complex strategies to influence pol-
icy. Such mechanisms of influence have received too little attention in the literature and do
not fall neatly into existing taxonomies of industry actors’ political strategies to influence
policymaking are outdated and fail to capture the multiplicity and complexity of their cur-
rent political strategies. For instance, Hillman and Hitt’s influential typology encompasses
information strategy, financial incentive strategy and constituency-building strategy (1999,
pp. 834–835). While these remain important strategies for industry actors seeking to shape
national legislation, and indeed, much of the activity we document within our case study
falls within these strategies, as we document in Section 6, industry actors today also deploy
more variegated strategies to influence policy.
2.2 The privatization of public labour standards
In addition to contributing to understandings of the mechanisms through which industry
actors shape public legislation, we seek to contribute to the emerging literature on how and
when displacement of public regulation is occurring. Much of the attention to date has
focused on displacement during the policy implementation phase (e.g. use of private auditors
over state labour inspectors), or straightforward trade-offs between distinct private and
8 G. LeBaron and A. Ru¨hmkorf
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public initiatives (e.g. enforcement of a company code of conduct versus national labour reg-
ulation). However, as we document below, displacement can also occur during the policy-
making process, as industry actors seek to strategically mobilize private labour governance
initiatives and influence policymakers to replace public standards, tools and enforcement
mechanisms with private standards, tools and enforcement mechanisms within public legis-
lation. In other words, private labour standards do not only displace public standards by
substituting for or preventing new legislation, but also by diluting the quality of new legisla-
tion and effectively privatizing it—rendering it far less stringent and ‘hard’ in legal terms
than is frequently assumed.
The literature on displacement has tended to focus on trade-offs that occur after regula-
tion is passed, with recent studies, for instance, arguing that the growth of CSR has hol-
lowed out public support for certain forms of legislation and state spending (Burgoon and
Fransen, 2017), or that CSR forestalls binding regulation of multinational corporations
(Taylor, 2011). However, although the agency of private actors within public labour gover-
nance creation has been widely overlooked, the importance of actors’ interests are often
acknowledged in relation to the creation of private governance mechanisms. Guided by
these insights, we seek to broaden the focus to show that public–private interactions also
shape the content of regulation itself. Recognizing this requires us to move beyond the overly
simplistic conception of public and private governance prominent within the literature.
Indeed, there has been a tendency to assume a priori that private initiatives will create a
lesser need for public regulation or enforcement and that by expanding corporate profits
and power, private governance will inherently reduce the ability of states to regulate and of
societal coalitions to create change. There has been a related tendency to see public and pri-
vate labour governance as distinct and easily separable, and to assume that public regulation
is ‘hard’, mandatory and stringent, while private is ‘soft’, voluntary and difficult to enforce.
In highlighting how private actors and initiatives influence the content and substance of
public legislation, we challenge the tendency to conceptualize public legislation as homoge-
nous and uniformly stringent. Scholarship on private labour governance has explored differ-
ences across instrument quality, and has critically analysed and compared the stringency
within and across instruments, including social audit methodologies, multi-stakeholder
standards, certification schemes and corporate codes of conduct (Fransen and Kolk, 2007;
Fransen, 2012b; Locke, 2013; LeBaron et al., 2017). Yet, by contrast, public legislation is
often assumed to be much more uniform than private governance mechanisms, and state-
based regulation in particular is considered legally binding and effective. However, this con-
ception glosses over the sizable variation that exists in the quality of recent public legislation
to bolster labour standards, and the domestic-level politics and policy processes that help to
explain this variation.
2.3 Centralizing domestic struggles
As mentioned, many studies of corporate governance have focused on macro and global lev-
els and the evolution of transnational norms, leaving aside the questions of why, when and
how national governments enact legislation to reflect shifting international norms on issues
like corporate accountability and anti-slavery. In relation to anti-slavery norms in particular,
scholars frequently assume that over two centuries ago, slavery was abolished once a new
transnational norm of equality was diffused across states. Indeed, anti-slavery is often cele-
brated as a victory by scholars of contemporary global political economy. Researchers of
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social movements write with admiration about the 19th century activists who banded
together across national borders to successfully pressure national governments to abolish an
institution on which powerful business interests and the expanding market economy
depended (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; David, 2007; Davies, 2014). Similarly, scholars inter-
ested in the role of norms in international politics often cite the abolition of slavery as an
example of the power of international norms to diffuse and change society by filtering
through the domestic structures of states (Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).
This is particularly common in constructivist approaches. Martha Finnemore describes, for
instance, ‘The triumph of core international norms may create gross secular changes in inter-
national politics by delegitimating and effectively eliminating some forms of behavior (as,
for example, the human equality norm has eliminated slavery)’ (1996, p. 139).
Such accounts, however, cannot explain why slavery persists in the global economy two
centuries after the ‘norm’ of anti-slavery became prominent. Nor can they adequately
explain why new international norms around corporate accountability are taking on such
varied national institutional forms. Our approach to understanding interaction between the
international and national spheres is guided by recent scholarship that demonstrates that
norm diffusion is not passive or automatic, but rather is shaped by national politics and cul-
ture and is negotiated by domestic actors in the face of competing interests (Acharya, 2004;
Bieler and Morton, 2008). We do not assume that the new global norm of corporate
accountability will be transferred automatically to national governments, but rather, are
interested in how it is being contested and shaped at domestic scales. Our case study of new
anti-slavery legislation in the UK is therefore designed to shed light into the obstacles that
continue to constrain the effective diffusion of anti-slavery norms, and in particular, how
these can be trumped and diluted by the power of economic interests, and therefore to con-
tribute to understandings of why forced labour continues to thrive in the contemporary
global economy.
3. Governing forced labour in supply chains: societal pressure and
government response
The UK’s 2015 Modern Slavery Act has been part of a wave of new governance initiatives
to combat severe labour exploitation that has emerged over the last decade. As mentioned in
Section 1, these initiatives have taken a variety of public, private and hybridized regulatory
forms. Transnational labour governance has primarily taken the form of private regulation,
as provisions around human rights and labour abuse have been incorporated into new due
diligence and corporate accountability guidelines including the UN Guiding Principles for
Business and Human Rights. Similarly, at the regional level, the European Union Directive
2014/95/EU, which aims to improve company transparency in regards to non-financial and
diversity information, incorporates labour standards and human rights. In addition,
although the abolition of slavery is already part of several global treaties, conventions and
declarations in international law such as the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, in 2014, a new protocol was adopted to the ILO’s Forced Labour
Convention of 1930, to intensify efforts to eliminate contemporary forms of slavery.
In the wake of these transnational developments, national and sub-national governments
began to pass legislation with the aim of strengthening corporate accountability, and
addressing forced labour in supply chains more specifically. As documented by Phillips et al.
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(2016), this body of legislation takes three key forms: (a) legislation that is broadly CSR
focused and requires companies to report on a host of issues including CSR activities and
environmental and social performance, including labour standards (e.g. India 2013
Companies Act); (b) legislation that is focused exclusively on labour standards, and often on
forced labour, human trafficking and modern slavery in particular (e.g. California 2012
Transparency in Supply Chains Act); and (c) sector-specific legislation that incorporates
labour standards, often alongside other CSR concerns (e.g. Dodd–Frank Act, Section 1502).
The theme of corporate responsibility for forced labour, human trafficking and slavery in
supply chains is prominent across all three categories of legislation.
National and sub-national legislation differs in terms of stringency and level of hybridity.
Key indicators of stringency include: overall legislative approach (e.g. extra-territorial crimi-
nal liability versus transparency); whether requirements for due diligence and disclosure are
mandatory or optional; whether requirements are specific or vague; whether companies are
required to report on their existing efforts, or the effectiveness of those efforts; and whether
there is a penalty for non-compliance. Levels of hybridity refer to the extent to which the
legislation incorporates private standards, tools and enforcement mechanisms, rather than
traditional public ones.
While a comprehensive review of this legislation lies outside the scope of this article, it is
important to note here that significant variation exists across national legislation passed to
spur corporate accountability for labour practices between 2009 and 2017. While some
legislation, such as Brazil’s National Action plan, contains legally binding provisions around
supply chains, other pieces of legislation such as the influential California Transparency in
Supply Chains Act merely require companies to disclose any voluntary efforts they are mak-
ing to eradicate slavery from their supply chains, with no penalty for reporting they are
doing nothing, and no direct penalty for non-disclosure. Similarly, while a Sao Paolo law
enacted in 2013 to counter forced and trafficked labour is enforced through a system of pub-
lic inspection, a 2012 US Executive Order to Strengthen Protection against Trafficking in
Persons in Federal Contracts relies on private social audits. At the high-stringency end of the
spectrum are laws like the 2017 French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law, which establishes
new legally binding obligations for large companies to identify and prevent human rights
and environmental abuse in their supply chains. Although the French constitutional court
recently removed the initially included sanctions of up to e30 million for non-compliance,
companies can still be ordered to comply with the duty to establish, publish and implement
a plan (subject to a penalty). Moreover, companies are subject to a civil liability regime to
injured parties that have suffered a harm. At the low-stringency end of the spectrum are
laws like the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act that create new obligations for companies to
report on voluntary efforts to prevent and address slavery, but do not include binding public
standards or sanctions for non-compliance.
Large-scale comparative research will be required to understand why national legislation
has taken such diverse forms, particularly as many laws cover the same large multinational
companies, and because some laws concretize commitments to the same regional initiatives,
such as is the case among EU countries’ implementation of European Union Directive 2014/
95/EU. Our hunch is that one explanation for variation lies in the interactions between pub-
lic and private governance mechanisms, and the political forces, forms of power and bar-
gaining processes that have made them. In the remainder of this article, we seek to
understand such dynamics in relation to the UK Modern Slavery Act. Beforehand, however,
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a brief overview of the broader societal coalition that has pushed for and championed this
legislation is useful in understanding the regulatory context in which pressure for a UK
Modern Slavery Act emerged.
3.1 Societal coalition
This recent wave of governance initiatives to combat forced labour and strengthen labour
standards more broadly has emerged in response to nearly two decades of media, consumer
and advocacy pressure on governments to address the role of business and multinational
supply chains in creating the conditions for forced labour, slavery and human trafficking
and labour abuse more broadly.
The ‘modern day abolitionist’ movement is concentrated in the USA, Australia and UK,
where it centres on large NGOs like Walk Free Foundation and Free the Slaves, and brings
together an eclectic range of societal groups from Christian churches to migrant rights
organizations to traditional labour rights groups like trade unions.3 Without disregarding
the importance of hundreds of smaller groups and industry-specific initiatives, Table 1 lists
the dominant NGOs, foundations and agencies working to eradicate forced labour and
overlapping practices including child labour and human trafficking. Although important
ideological differences exist between these organizations, they have exerted pressure on gov-
ernments around a relatively coherent set of demands, centred on the need to enact regula-
tion to reduce the prevalence of and ultimately eradicate forced labour.
Significantly, as NGO critiques of the business of forced labour began to intensify in the
early 2000s, an industry-led coalition emerged to showcase and promote CSR initiatives
around forced labour. In 2006, the first major industry-led campaign against human
trafficking—End Human Trafficking Now!—was founded, and leading figures within it later
founded the industry-led network involved in shaping new regulation on forced labour and
trafficking, the Global Business Coalition against Trafficking (GBCAT).4
Until very recently, the industry-led and societal coalitions around forced labour rarely
intersected, due to scepticism on both sides. But in the past few years, as industry actors
have intensified their efforts to shape national legislation and transnational protocols on
forced labour, and as NGOs and industry have increasingly interacted through meetings
convened by the ILO, Global Compact, and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
there have been deepening links and interactions between the activist and industry anti-
slavery coalitions.5 This is consistent with the broader trend of NGOs embracing the world’s
biggest corporations as allies rather than adversaries (Dauvergne and LeBaron, 2014).
Significantly, in a number of jurisdictions, corporate actors have argued that anti-slavery
legislation would be redundant to their private initiatives to ‘slavery-proof’ their supply
chains.6 The main strategy that companies use to detect and address labour exploitation in
their supply chains is ethical auditing. However, most companies audit only their first-tier
suppliers, and only a couple of times per year, in spite of mounting evidence that forced
labour tends to occur in lower tiers of production and among agency workers who are not
3 Interviews with NGOs, industry representatives and government representatives, London, March
2012.
4 Interview with David Arkless, London, March 2012.
5 Interviews with NGO representatives and David Arkless, London, March 2012.
6 Interview with lobbyist, California, 10 May 2013.
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Table 1. Institutionalized global activism to eradicate slavery
All contemporary
forms of slavery
Human trafficking
and ‘sexual
slavery’
Migrant
exploitation and
forced labour
Child labour and
slavery
NGOs,
Trade Unions,
Foundations &
United Nations
Agencies
 Amnesty
International
 Human Rights
Watch
 Anti-Slavery
International
 Anti-Slavery
Society
 American-Anti-
Slavery Group
 Free the Slaves
 Save a Slave
 Human Rights
International
 International
Labor Rights
Fund
 Polaris Project
 The Wyndham
Charitable
Trust
 Not for Sale
 Human Rights
Internet
 United Nations
Office on Drugs
and Crime
 ILO, Special
Action
Programme to
Combat Forced
Labour (SAP-
FL)
 ILO, Better
Work
 Project to End
Human
Trafficking
 The
Emancipation
Network
 Coalition
Against
Trafficking in
Women
 People Against
Trafficking
Humans
 Global Alliance
Against
Trafficking in
Women
 Global Rights
Initiative
Against
Trafficking in
Persons
 Human
Trafficking
Search
 La Strada
International
 Coalition to
Abolish Slavery
and Trafficking
 Shared Hope
International
 Protection
Project
 ILO
 United Nations
Global
Initiative to
Fight Human
Trafficking
 Kalayaan
 Matahari Eye
of the Day
 Global
Workers Justice
Alliance
 Irish Congress
of Trade
Workers
 International
Confederation
of Free Trade
Unions
 Trade Unions
Congress (UK)
 Instituto
Sindicale per la
Cooperazione
et lo Sviluppo
 Coalition of
Labor Union
Women
 World
Confederation
of Labor
 International
Organization
for Migration
 ILO, Migrant
 ECPAT
 Save the
Children
 Child Labor
Coalition
 Child Rights
Information
Network
 Action Against
Trafficking and
Sexual
Exploitation of
Children
 Casa Alianza
 Child Rights
Information
Network
 Child Workers
in Asia
 Child Workers
in Nepal
 Child Watch
 Concerned for
Working
Children
 Global March
Against Child
Labour
 Free the
Children
 The World
Bank
 ECLT
Foundation
Source: adapted and expanded from the United Nations Officer of High Commissioner for Human Rights (2015).
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employed as part of companies’ core workforces and therefore, rarely included in audits
(Barrientos, 2011; Crane et al., 2017; Phillips, 2013). In addition, while policies against
child and forced labour have long been included within labour codes of conduct, companies
are also increasingly including explicit policies on forced labour directly within supplier
agreements. The continued absence of public governance initiatives to combat the business
of forced labour has served to reinforce the authority and legitimacy of private regulatory
programmes, in spite of increasing evidence of their ineffectiveness in detecting and eradicat-
ing forced labour.7
4. Methodology
Our research has focused on the role of societal actors, businesses and industry associations
in the making of the UK’s Modern Slavery Act, beginning in 2010. We chose to focus on the
UK as one of the most heavily regulated countries in terms of CSR due diligence and corpo-
rate accountability legislation. We selected the Modern Slavery Act because it is considered
a landmark piece of legislation, and because the policymaking process that led to the Act
was well documented in official, publicly available information.
Data collection involved two phases: (a) an extensive desk-based review and analysis of
over 150 written and oral evidence statements given to the UK Parliament, with a particular
focus on recommendations to address the role of business and supply chains; and (b) quali-
tative semi-structured interviews with participants which included key informants in the
field. During the desk-based review, we read, coded and analysed a total of 157 evidence
statements by representatives of industry associations, UK companies, multinational compa-
nies, NGOs, religious organizations, multi-stakeholder initiatives, government and other
experts. We coded these evidence statements according to the stringency of their regulatory
recommendations for firms, and according to their overall support for public and private
governance initiatives. In our analysis of the evidence statements, we took into account that
the company representatives knew that their answers were to be made public and could
have reputational repercussions. We therefore compared their statements against the
responses made by business organizations which represent the industry as a whole. Our
desk-based review also included lobbying documents produced by UK-based firms, NGOs
and the government between 2010 and 2014. Most of this documentation was obtained by
attending events in London, which served as important strategy discussions for the NGO
and expert coalition attempting to influence the Modern Slavery Bill.
In addition, a total of 20 in-depth interviews were conducted. Interviews were conducted
with experts on forced labour who had been involved in the UK policy process, including
trade unionists, NGO representatives, employer representatives, industry association repre-
sentatives, company CEOs and ethical auditors. The interviews were then transcribed and
analysed using NVivo 10 software. Finally, in March 2015, after the final contents of the
Act were clear, a further round of 15 short conversations were held in London. These inter-
views were used to test our hypotheses and findings.
Our case study is exploratory and should be understood as an initial plausibility probe of
our intuition that societal coalitions to bolster public labour protections are being weakened
7 For an overview of the ineffectiveness of audits in detecting, addressing and correcting forced
labour, see Crane et al. (2017).
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by industry actors, in part, through their strategic mobilization of private governance initia-
tives during domestic policymaking processes. We have focused on a single case study to
gain a rich empirical understanding of the influence of private actors on national policy.
This approach has several limits, one of which is that it is difficult to establish the conditions
under which private labour governance initiatives displace or disrupt public initiatives,
beyond the bounds of our single case. Much more extensive comparative research will be
needed to specify these conditions, and we make suggestions in the Section 7 for directions
that this could take. Our primary aim in this article is to highlight the impact of industry
actors on the substance and content of the UK Modern Slavery Act and to provide an early
exploration of one set of possible consequences in terms of its effectiveness.
5. Public regulatory options to strengthen governance systems to
eradicate forced labour
As has been the case in many national jurisdictions, at the beginning of the legislative proc-
ess in the UK there were a number of regulatory tools under consideration of varying levels
of stringency. Although none of the proposed tools departed radically from the UK govern-
ment’s ongoing ‘light-touch’ approach to governing business, legislators made it clear that
their goal was to create legislation that would be effective in eradicating slavery from supply
chains. At the beginning of the process, there was relative consensus—which was well
expressed by legislators in the Draft Modern Slavery Bill Report— that ‘voluntary initiatives
alone will not be enough to ensure that all companies take the necessary steps to eradicate
slavery from their supply chains’.8 In the remainder of this section, we provide an overview
of the varied legal consequences that these different regulatory tools would have had for
companies, since this is necessary to contextualize our argument and findings about how
and why the bargaining process evolved as it did.
5.1 Tackling forced labour through public initiatives: criminal law versus
transparency reporting
In legal terms, governing labour standards in supply chains constitutes a significant chal-
lenge (Anner, 2012; Marx et al., 2014). The difficulty for legal accountability is that the use
of forced labour usually occurs at supplier or sub-supplier factories, and—in the case of mul-
tinational enterprises—very often occurs in the developing world. The legal liability for
using forced labour in global supply chain lies, first and foremost, with the supplier in the
developing world who commits the human rights violation and not with the multinational
enterprise based in the global North and West that sells the end-product. In English law,9
because multinational companies are separate legal entities from their suppliers, there is no
vicarious liability of the multinational enterprise for the crimes and/or torts committed by
the supplier.10 Furthermore, if a supplier in the developing world uses forced labour, the
8 See Draft Modern Slavery Bill, accessed at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/jtse
lect/jtslavery/166/16608.htm on October 17, 2017.
9 Although the Modern Slavery Act is a ‘UK Act’, i.e. it applies to the whole of the UK, we refer to
‘English law’ here. The UK has three different legal systems. English law is the legal system govern-
ing England and Wales and thus the legal system that applies to the majority of the UK.
10 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] BCLC 479.
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case would usually be heard in that country and decided upon the basis of the law of that
jurisdiction due to the rules of private international law. The challenge is that this country’s
law may not cover forced labour, or, more likely, law enforcement mechanisms in that coun-
try could be weak due to limited access to justice or corruption (Kucera, 2008; Greenhill
et al., 2009).
Against this background, the idea to regulate global supply chains in English law through
the Modern Slavery Act developed from the recognition that the home country of multina-
tional enterprises should not turn a blind eye to recurrent reports about gross human rights
violations at supplier factories. The UK government has faced pressure to enact anti-slavery
legislation for over a decade, and this was further fuelled by developments within the global
governance arena that called for heightened corporate accountability for labour practices
and human rights in supply chains. Anti-Slavery International11 has been at the forefront of
these efforts, and has previously led successful coalitions to pressure the UK government to
define and criminalize forced labour, introduce laws against trafficking and commit to rati-
fying the Council of Europe Convention against trafficking.12 Other important activist play-
ers include Kalayaan, Stop the Traffik, Walk Free, Migrants’ Rights Network, and FLEX.
These organizations have exerted pressure around a coherent set of demands, focused on the
need for government to bolster public standards and enforcement to eradicate forced labour.
Significantly, these NGOs played an important role in identifying and garnishing support
for the more stringent regulatory options discussed in the draft Modern Slavery Bill.
At the beginning of the legislative process, the government was considering three models
through which the Modern Slavery Bill could address forced labour in supply chains (sum-
marized in Table 2), and appeared open at the beginning of the consultation process towards
adopting any of the three options. Although prevailing theories of neoliberalism suggest that
‘hard law’ approaches to governing business wouldn’t be possible for ideological reasons
and due to limited state budgets to enforce such regulations, we believe that it was a genuine
possibility for the UK government to opt for one of two ‘harder’ proposals.13 This is evi-
denced by comments made in early hearings held by the Joint Committee on the Draft
Modern Slavery Bill and in the substance of the Draft Bill itself. In addition, as we discuss in
the following section, important and recent precedents for this exist in ‘hard’ corporate law
on bribery within UK and in ‘hard’ due diligence law recently enacted by other countries in
Europe.
The most stringent option, the Bribery model, was discussed in the hearings of the Joint
Committee. Aidan McQuade, Director of Anti-Slavery International, argued on January 21,
2014 that the Bribery model was a ‘better model’ than the California transparency clause
model. Like the other two legislative options, the Bribery model was then put to Karen
Bradley, Minister for Modern Slavery and Organised Crime in the hearing on March 12,
2014. She was told by the committee that all three options are ‘things which tend to change
11 Anti-Slavery International ‘founded in 1839, is the world’s oldest international human rights organi-
zation and works to eliminate all forms of slavery around the world’. See: http://www.antislavery.
org/english/who_we_are/default.aspx (accessed March 1, 2015).
12 Interview with Anti-Slavery International, March 2012.
13 In his assessment of New Labour’s approach to regulating the financial markets, Shaw more gener-
ally describes how the fact that the UK is a liberal-market economy has contributed to ‘light-touch’
approach towards business regulation, see Shaw (2012).
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Table 2. Proposed legislative options to strengthen UK governance to eradicate forced labour
Legislative option Company duties Company liabilities
Bribery Act Model Companies must not be associated
with a person that uses forced
labour
Liability exists for the use of forced
labour by a person associated with
the company which could be a
supplier
In order to have a defence against the
offence of modern slavery, the
company needs to be able to
prove that it had ‘adequate
procedures’ in place designed to
prevent persons associated with it
from using forced labour
An offence is committed irrespective of
whether the acts or omissions which
form part of the offence take place in
the UK or elsewhere (extraterritorial
liability)
Due diligence is among the principles
that constitute ‘adequate
procedures’
Liability does not only exist for
companies that have been
incorporated in the UK, but also to
those companies which carry on a
business, or are part of a business, in
any part of the UK
Due diligence procedures mean that
the company has policies in place
which prevent persons associated
with it from using forced labour,
e.g. codes of conduct imposed on
business partners
The only available sentence for a
commercial organization is a fine, the
amount of which is unlimited
Companies Act
Reporting
The reporting on modern slavery
prevention in supply chains
would be based on an
amendment of section 414C(7)
CA 2006—the strategic report
If the strategic report does not contain
information regarding the issues
mentioned in s414C(7) CA, it must
only state which of these categories it
does not contain (companies could
just state that their strategic report
does not contain information about
modern slavery)
In the strategic report a quoted
company must, to the extent
necessary for an understanding of
the development, performance or
position of the company’s
business include information
about environmental matters, the
company’s employees and social,
community and human rights
issues. The prevention of modern
slavery in its supply chain,
including information about any
policies of the company in
relation to those matters and the
Pursuant to s463 CA, directors are only
liable for false and misleading
statements or the omission of
anything required to be in the report
under the condition that the director
knew that the statement was untrue
or misleading or if he was reckless as
to whether it was untrue or
misleading and he knew the omission
to be dishonest concealment of a
material fact.
continued
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Table 2. Continued
Legislative option Company duties Company liabilities
effectiveness of those policies
would be added to this list
The Secretary of State would specify
by Order the requirements for the
modern slavery section to
include, among others,
verification, auditing and
certification
This section effectively restricts liability
to cases of deceit. It cannot arise in
negligence which is the reason why it
has been called a ‘safe harbour
provision’
California’s
Transparency
in Supply
Chains Model
Commercial organizations carrying
on a business in the UK with an
annual turnover of £36m or more
are required to prepare a slavery
and human trafficking statement
for each financial year
If the company has not taken steps to
ensure that slavery and human
trafficking take place in its supply
chain it must issue a statement that it
has not taken such steps
The statement must describe the steps
which the organization has taken
during the financial year to
ensure that slavery and human
trafficking does not take place in
any of its supply chain and in any
part of its own business
There is no liability if the company issues
a statement that it has taken ‘no such
steps’—it has then complied with its
statutory reporting duty
The transparency clause contains a
list of issues that a company ‘may
include information about’ such
as its policies in relation to
slavery and human trafficking
and its due diligence processes in
relation to slavery and human
trafficking in its business and
supply chains
The duty to issue a statement is
enforceable by the Secretary of State
through an injunction
If the company has a website it must
publish the slavery and human
trafficking statement on that
website and include a link to the
statement in a prominent place
on that website’s homepage
It is not compulsory to include the list of
factors into the statement. The
government’s guidance refers to these
as ‘these points provide guidance and
examples as to the type of
information to include in a
statement’In the case of a corporation, the
statement must be approved by
the board of directors and signed
by a director
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behaviour dramatically’, Bradley responded that she was taking ‘the point completely’ and
wanted to make sure that the government got this right so that the government would ‘catch
the bad guys’. We interviewed Lord Andrew Stunell who, in his capacity as an MP, was a
Member of the Joint Committee. He stated that the process in the Committee started ‘in an
open-ended way’ and that ‘the methodology with which we could best deal with supply
chains wasn’t settled’. He confirmed to us that ‘it was not a foregone conclusion in the Joint
Committee that the transparency model would be favoured in the end over the other two
models’.14 The combination of Stunell’s and Bradley’s comments shows that all three models
were given full consideration in the legislative process and that all of them could have
become the option of choice.
The Draft Modern Slavery Bill, published shortly after the hearings in April 2014,
also presents and comments upon all three models, underscoring their viability. The
Joint Committee on the Draft Bill notes, inter alia, that it ‘considered legislation based
on the Bribery Act 2010’. While they mention that not all of their witnesses ‘were con-
vinced that this was an effective option’, they did not make any specific comments
about why they did not choose this option in the end. Interestingly, an amendment of
the Companies Act was the preferred option in the Draft Bill (referred to as ‘a propor-
tionate and industry-supported initial step’). Although this option is not as stringent as
the Bribery Act model, it is still one of the two harder proposals. This further strength-
ens our view that ‘harder’ options were realistic and receiving full consideration within
the Modern Slavery Act. The remainder of this section of the article will assess the legal
effects of these three mechanisms.
5.2 Possible consequences of new public governance initiatives for firms
Table 2 outlines three public initiatives for regulating supply chains in the Modern Slavery
Bill that were considered by the legislator.
The first option that was considered by the Draft Modern Slavery Bill Joint Committee
was to create criminal liability for forced labour, by modelling legislation after the UK Bribery
Act 2010, through which the government created an offence for corporations that can be
liable for bribery committed by a person ‘associated’ with it. Criminal liability for forced
labour in the supply chain would have been a strong regulatory instrument for the combatting
of forced labour for several reasons. The combined effect of extraterritorial liability and being
liable for the acts of an associated person means that there is potentially far-reaching liability.
In practice, the most important aspect of this regulatory mechanism is that companies have a
defence if they can prove that they had ‘adequate procedures’ such as due diligence in place
which were designed to prevent persons associated with it from undertaking such conduct.15
A possible due diligence procedure for an English company would be to ensure that its over-
seas suppliers have policies that prevent bribery (or here forced labour). The fact that, at the
moment, UK companies seem to have much more extensive procedures and guidelines for pre-
venting bribery in their supply chain than for other CSR issues such as forced labour reflects
14 Interview with Lord Stunell, via telephone, September 2017.
15 S7 (2) UK Bribery Act 2010. See also Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance about
Procedures which Relevant Commercial Organisations Can Put in Place to Prevent Persons
Associated with Them from Bribing (2011) ‘Case study 6 – Principle 4 Due diligence of agents’.
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the requirements established by the defence of ‘adequate procedures’.16 However, the option
to introduce criminal liability was rejected by the government.
The second option was to impose reporting requirements on companies by amending
existing non-financial reporting required by the Companies Act 2006.17 In its Draft Modern
Slavery Bill, the Joint Committee favoured the option to create reporting on the supply chain
through an amendment of the strategic report, by adding modern slavery to section 414C(7)
CA.18 An amendment to the Companies Act would have been a less stringent regulatory
option compared to the Bribery Act model, because it allows directors to make quite neutral
statements and because liability cannot arise in negligence and is restricted to cases of deceit,
so is considered a ‘safe harbor provision’.19 Ultimately, this legislative option was passed
over in favour of an even less stringent model.
The third option—to create a separate reporting duty on modern slavery based on the
example of the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act—became the legislative
option of choice. The Modern Slavery Act establishes a reporting duty on some commercial
organizations to prepare a slavery and human trafficking statement for each financial year
(s54); however, its transparency clause is even weaker than that in the Californian Act.
Whereas the Californian version explicitly requires disclosure about issues such as verifica-
tion, audits and certification, the Modern Slavery Act is more generic, only referring to ‘steps
the organisation has taken . . . to ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not taking
place’.20 However, both versions are similar in that companies that have not done anything
to combat modern slavery in their supply chain only need to issue a statement that they had
not taken such steps. The vagueness of the clause means that there is nothing specific that
companies need to report on. As one senior government official explained, ‘We want busi-
ness to disclose the steps they’ve taken, but we will not say what the steps will be. That’s for
every business to decide.’21 The wording of the statutory transparency requirement leaves
full discretion to companies, opening the danger that companies will just publish boilerplate
statements.
In light of these weaknesses in legislative design, of the three regulatory options
considered by the government the transparency approach is the least stringent, applying a
‘light-touch’ regulatory framework to governing businesses and validating existing private
governance initiatives (which, given that there are at least 10 000–13 000 victims of forced
labour in the UK workforce by government’s own estimate, are clearly insufficient).22
6. Findings: the role of industry and NGOs in shaping
regulatory outcomes
Rather than strengthening or challenging existing CSR-based anti-slavery initiatives, the
UK’s Modern Slavery Act bolsters voluntary, industry-led approaches to detecting and
16 See the analysis of contractual CSR documents of 15 FTSE100 companies in Andreas Ru¨hmkorf (2015).
17 S414A CA.
18 Joint Committee on the Draft Modern Slavery Bill, Draft Modern Slavery Bill: Report (Session 2013-
14, HL Paper 166, HC 1019, April 2014) 85–90.
19 Hannigan (2012).
20 S52 (4) Modern Slavery Bill.
21 Interview with government representative, London, March 2015.
22 UK Home Office (2014b) .
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addressing severe exploitation. Through what configuration of pressures and social forces
did this new legislation come about, and did it come to prevail over more stringent policy
initiatives in the UK context? And with what consequences for efforts to eradicate forced
labour?
In studying these questions, we are not attempting to discount or ignore the broader,
global political economic context in which bargaining over the UK legislation has taken
place. We agree with those who have argued, as Nicola Phillips and Fabiola Mieres have put
it, that ‘action designed to address the root causes of forced labour in the global economy is
significantly constrained by a widespread political orthodoxy rooted in an unshaken
“market fundamentalism” and a reluctance significantly to challenge the private sector and
powerful corporations’ (Phillips and Mieres, 2015, p. 12; see also Bartley, 2003). Yet, it is
nevertheless important to understand how specific regulatory outcomes are achieved, and
the evolving role of private actors within these. Moreover, given the variation in national
legislation to bolster corporate accountability, it is important to seek to understand the
struggles through which new legislation is shaped and contested.
This section of the article presents our findings. We make three principal arguments.
First, we argue that the coalition attempting to improve public regulation to address forced
labour in supply chains was disrupted by the emergence of a private governance alternative.
Second, our research suggests that CSR was used as a strategy to deflect more stringent legis-
lation, albeit in different ways by different factions of industry. Multinational brand and
retail companies, already covered under the California Act, lobbied the government to
include transparency provisions in the Modern Slavery Bill. Manufacturers, and some UK
companies—who would have faced the greatest liability and loss of business value from a
stringent regulatory outcome—collaborated with industry associations to mobilize new
business-led anti-slavery initiatives, and argued against the inclusion of supply chain provi-
sions that would add an ‘additional level of burden’ to their existing voluntary initiatives.23
Ultimately, policymakers responded to these competing demands by foregoing more strin-
gent regulatory options modelled after the Bribery or Company Act, and by including a
vague transparency in supply chains provision within the Act, which essentially gives statu-
tory backing to multinational’s existing voluntary reporting. Finally, we argue that growing
NGO involvement in industry-led ‘anti-slavery’ initiatives is expanding the political traction
of private regulatory approaches to these problems.
6.1 Multinationals launch a ‘transparency coalition’
As discussed in Section 3, in the midst of this pressure on governments to address the role of
supply chains in giving rise to forced labour, a global coalition of multinational enterprises
emerged to champion business solutions to combatting slavery. This global business coali-
tion played a key role in shaping the UK Modern Slavery Bill. Shortly after California’s
Transparency in Supply Chains (TISC) legislation was passed, efforts ramped up across the
UK to introduce similar initiatives. The push for transparency legislation came from the net-
works of the GBCAT and End Human Trafficking Now—developed and led by multina-
tional enterprises. As David Arkless described, ‘We believe that the best way to get an act
23 Paul Lister (Primark), Giles Bolton (Tesco), Judith Batchelar (Sainsbury’s), Evidence to the UK
Parliament Joint Committee on the Draft Modern Slavery Bill, available online: http://www.parlia
mentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId¼15063 (accessed August 10, 2014).
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through is to write a cohesive bill, a draft bill, which takes into account all aspects of slavery
in the UK. . .So, we’ve taken the California act and we rewrote it in the United Kingdom.’24
A ‘transparency coalition’ emerged in the UK, comprised of multinational enterprises includ-
ing IKEA and Amazon, ethical investment and shareholder groups, and others involved in
GBCAT and existing industry anti-slavery initiatives.25 The goal of this coalition was to
deflect more stringent public initiatives such as the imposition of criminal offenses, and to
ensure that the Modern Slavery Bill did not expand existing statutory disclosure duties.
A crucial part of the strategy to pressure the UK government to enact transparency legis-
lation was strategic partnership with NGOs. As David Arkless described their efforts,
‘We’ve got a number of streams of work in here. Again, it’s split into three bits: legislation
and government, not-for-profit contribution, and corporate leverage or pressure.’26 At the
outset of the regulatory process, most UK-based NGOs were highly sceptical of business ini-
tiatives to promote transparency legislation. As one of our informants described, ‘At the
moment, what you’ve got is a few NGOs that want to work with those businesses but
they’re getting flack from the other NGOs ’cause they’re working with business.’27 But
Arkless’ coalition continued to push for ‘a group of the top NGOs in this area, in the UK, to
form a coalition to work together in a much more coherent way’.28
Crucial here was the argument that NGOs working alongside companies would ulti-
mately do more to address forced labour in supply chains than continuing to treat compa-
nies as adversaries. As one industry informant tasked with ‘reaching out’ to NGOs
described, ‘They have to change the narrative from big bad naughty business, when they
find it, to: great you’ve found [forced labour]. Now tell us what you’re doing to stop it . . .. If
they can begin to engage, then you know, it’s a much more effective thing.’29 This argument
was communicated at various consultations, as well as bilateral conversations, during the
Parliamentary process. While some smaller, more radical NGOs continued to resist any type
of collaboration with business, others came to see transparency legislation as a reasonable
‘first step’, and strategic collaboration with industry as a pre-requisite for getting the
Modern Slavery Bill through Parliament.30
An important turning point in the bargaining process came in the wake of the publication
of a report, It Happens Here: Equipping the United Kingdom to Fight Modern Slavery,
funded by Manpower Group and the Qatar Foundation, published by the Centre for Social
Justice. Central among its recommendations was the enactment of the Transparency in UK
Company Supply Chains Bill.31 The report argued that transparency legislation would send
‘a positive message to the business world, not negatively forcing companies’ hands but
encouraging them to look into the problem’ (The Centre for Social Justice, 2013, p. 13). The
report was widely cited by the Government—who said it led to a ‘step change in how
the government was looking at the issue of modern slavery’—and was extensively profiled in
24 Interview with David Arkless, London, March 2012.
25 Interview with lobbyist, London, March 2012.
26 Interview with David Arkless, London, March 2012.
27 Personal communication with industry actor leading NGO outreach, London, March 2012.
28 Personal communication with David Arkless, London, March 2012.
29 Interview with industry actor leading NGO outreach, London, March 2012.
30 Interview with NGO representatives, London, March and April 2012.
31 See: http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2012-13/transparencyinukcompanysupplychainseradicationof
slavery.html (accessed March 1, 2014).
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the media. In its wake, an industry-led ‘Transparency in Supply Chains’ activist coalition
emerged, which included some of the larger anti-slavery NGOs such as Anti-Slavery
International, Amnesty International, Unseen, British Quakers, Evangelical Alliance and
Traidcraft.32
Significantly, between 2012 and 2014, major NGOs and religious groups—including
Anti-Slavery International, the Church of England and the Walk Free Foundation—
endorsed transparency legislation. One NGO leader described their decision as follows:
‘Businesses aren’t the only ones who need to demonstrate returns. We need to be seen as
making an impact, and endorsing transparency seemed like the way to do it.’33 Many of the
NGOs who endorsed transparency legislation continued to push for it to contain more strin-
gent measures along the lines of the Bribery Act or Companies Act. For instance, in a brief-
ing dated November 13, 2014, an NGO coalition that included Amnesty International,
Anti-Slavery International, Unseen and War on Want urged that ‘clearer and firmer terms
must be defined on the face of the Bill for what a company must actually do to comply with
the proposed measure’.34 But ultimately, NGO endorsement of transparency legislation
offered this industry-led initiative legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the government
and the wider public.35 Parliamentary debates often highlighted that NGOs and corpora-
tions were already working together directly on this issue.
In addition to building an industry-led NGO coalition to exert pressure for TISC-style
legislation, the transparency coalition mobilized a business lobby to pressure the govern-
ment. Much to the dismay of the transparency coalition—but to the relief of manufacturing
companies and industry associations, as will be discussed further in a moment—when the
revised draft Bill was put before Parliament in summer 2014, the section pertaining to sup-
ply chains and transparency had been removed entirely. In response, prominent members of
the transparency coalition published a statement in a right-wing English newspaper, The
Telegraph, arguing that ‘Failure to manage human rights issues in complex supply chains
could pose significant risks to investors’ (Howell et al., 2014). The statement endorsed trans-
parency legislation and was signed by executives from multinationals including Hermes,
BNP Paribas and Henderson Global Investors. This lobby was publicly mobilized at various
crucial points in the bargaining process to articulate clear support for transparency legisla-
tion by big business. As Arkless described this element of the strategy, ‘we’ve put in place a
huge business lobby, which is positive for the new act that we’re going to draft, to say busi-
ness wants this. They will go to the government and say, “Twenty of your biggest thirty
companies want you to make this law.” So we’re doing the business lobby thing’.36
32 See, for instance, Transparency in Supply Chains Coalition (2014) .
33 Interview with NGO representative, London, March 2015.
34 Amnesty International, Dalit Freedom Network, Anti-Slavery International, CAFOD, CORE, EJF,
Quakers, Tradecraft, Unseen and War on Want. ‘Briefing for the Second Reading of the Modern
Slavery Bill Transparency in the Supply Chain, 13 November 2014.’ On file with the author.
35 See, for instance, oral evidence to Parliament on NGO–industry collaboration. See also, Prabha
Kotiswaran’s oral history project which includes interviews with civil society actors engaged in
efforts to shape the UK Modern Slavery Act, published on openDemocracy.net; https://www.opende
mocracy.net/beyondslavery/msaoh/prabha-kotiswaran/path-to-uks-modern-slavery-act-2015-oral-
history-project (accessed September 8, 2017).
36 Interview with David Arkless, London, March 2012.
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The main resistance to transparency legislation ultimately came not from NGOs or
activists—many of whom came to see it as a politically viable and achievable component of
the legislation—but from manufacturing companies, as well as industry associations repre-
senting companies registered in the UK and that do business in the UK (and are thus liable
for forced labour). This industry group maintained a more predictable line of argument that
there was already enough ‘red tape’ on business. As Arkless described the opposing firms,
‘there is, of course, a big lobby against more governance. Big corporations and medium cor-
porations are saying, “We’re over-governed anyway. The last thing we need is more restric-
tions and requirements to audit ourselves.” So we’re fighting a tough battle there.’37 In
teaming up with NGOs against other businesses, multinationals were able to position them-
selves as allies in the fight to enact legislation to eradicate slavery.
In describing complex policy processes in this way, we do not mean to suggest that the
societal coalition pushing for tougher regulation was disrupted easily or in a uniform way.
Indeed, even as some NGOs were working alongside business to push forward transparency
legislation, others were working with lawyers to draft alternative bills, write reports, pres-
sure government and mobilize the grassroots. Ultimately, however, the transparency coali-
tion’s influence was more powerful.38
6.2 UK industry fights regulation by launching a multi-stakeholder initiative
The opposing industry coalition—which combated any inclusion of supply chains or busi-
ness in the Modern Slavery Bill, including transparency legislation—was led by industry
associations representing UK companies.39 As one government representative described,
‘The split was between retailers and manufacturers, and multinationals and UK companies –
all of whom are facing different concerns about liability.’40 Especially important here are
key players in the UK food industry—which is sizable in the UK with a ‘turnover of £1.34
billion in the last full financial year’, and which experiences widespread reports of exploita-
tion and forced labour, particularly in relation to agency workers provided to producers by
intermediaries around or below the minimum wage.41 Although there was some variation in
terms of how exact positions were expressed,42 overall, these actors were more resistant to
public legislation regarding forced labour and supply chains claiming it would be ‘burden-
some’ and ‘redundant’ to existing efforts. The Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply
37 Interview with David Arkless, London, March 2012.
38 Interview data.
39 The coalition is described as representing ‘UK companies’ as the members of the initiative are
based in the UK. The transparency clause in the UK Modern Slavery Act applies to any company
that carries on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the UK, wherever that organization
was incorporated or formed, and which has an annual turnover of £36 million or above. This means
that this reporting duty applies to both companies incorporated in the UK and foreign companies. In
its guidance on the Act, the government states that a ‘common sense approach’ should be applied
to decide whether or not a company formed outside the UK above the £36 million threshold can
properly be regarded as carrying on a business or part of a business in any part of the UK.
40 Interview with UK government representative, London, March 2015.
41 See: Paul Broadbent’s oral evidence to Parliament. For a discussion of forced labour in the UK food
industry, see Allain et al. (2013).
42 For instance, corporate actors who are both retailers and UK manufacturers expressed conflicting
positions (often from different offices within the same firm).
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(CIPS), for instance, stated: ‘CIPS does not believe that introducing punitive legislation
would be effective at this stage but would rather encourage organisations to take a self-
regulated approach with the backing and support of a voluntary code to aid them to – “do
the right thing.”’
One key tactic to deflect new legislation was to launch business-driven ‘multi-stake-
holder’ programme called the ‘Stronger Together Initiative’. This initiative was launched by
the Association for Labour Providers on October 13, 2013, while the draft Modern Slavery
Bill was making its way through Parliament. ‘Stronger Together’ is sponsored by major UK
supermarkets, including Marks & Spencer, Tesco, Sainsbury’s and Waitrose, and includes
the British Growers Association, British Retail Consortium, Food & Drink Federation, as
partners.43 It also includes a government agency, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority and
four societal groups—Anti-Slavery International, the Salvation Army, Migrant Help and the
International Organization for Migration—among its supporting partners. When asked
about their reasons for endorsing the initiative, one societal group representative noted, ‘the
days of government are over. It’s corporations who rule the world, however you slice it, and
they’ve placed themselves right in the middle of efforts to eradicate slavery’.44 A representa-
tive of an NGO that did not back the initiative claimed it was a ‘clear attempt to deflect
legislation’.45
The stated goal of the initiative is to ‘provide businesses with pragmatic good practice
guidance . . . to help them prevent and tackle hidden forced labour and human trafficking in
their supply chains’.46 It does so through ‘awareness raising activities’, and providing a ‘net-
work’ for businesses seeking to combat forced labour. Parliament questioned the coordina-
tor of the initiative about how many of the businesses involved have actually found forced
labour and taken action. He answered, ‘None have said that they found slaves, but 90-plus
per cent who have come on the workshops have said, “Yes, we are going to implement the
actions. We are going to put up the posters. We are going to put the stuff into
inductions.”’47 At best, there has yet to be evidence collected of the programmes’ effective-
ness, and at worst, it is a clear attempt to deflect more stringent regulation by initiating a
CSR programme. That the programme was mentioned 15 times throughout the
Parliamentary hearings—often as part of an explanation as to why legislation would be
redundant, given the ‘steps that have already been taken’—is worryingly suggestive of the
latter.
6.3 Understanding variation in industry response
While the UK and manufacturing companies’ response to legislation was predictable, the
question remains: why was a transnational business coalition dedicating such extensive
effort and resources to drafting and passing public anti-slavery legislation, which would at
the very least, draw attention to the widespread use of forced labour and slavery in their
global supply chains? Why were they so keen to partner up with NGOs who had long
43 See ‘Project Sponsors’, StrongerTogether website: http://stronger2gether.org/ (accessed March 1,
2015).
44 Interview with NGO representative, London, March 2015.
45 Interview with NGO representative, London, March 2015.
46 Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply, oral evidence to Parliament.
47 David Camp’s oral evidence to Parliament.
Domestic politics of corporate accountability legislation 25
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ser/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ser/mwx047/4683730
by University of Sheffield user
on 16 March 2018
decried their poor records on forced labour and exploitation more broadly? Our research
points to at least three reasons. First of all, key members of GBCAT were now already cov-
ered under the California legislation and saw the transparency legislation as a means of
achieving convergence in regards to government requirements.48 Secondly, given that forced
labour was more likely to occur in these companies’ overseas supply chains, more stringent
governance initiatives (such as the Bribery Act or Companies Act) would have imposed seri-
ous new liability for these firms. Finally, many of these actors argued that government had a
responsibility to ‘level the playing field’ by also requiring smaller businesses to take responsi-
bility for the use of forced labour and slavery. In short, as Daniel Mu¨gge has described it,
‘Firms feeling disadvantaged will call on public actors to protect them’ (2007, p. 31).
With regard to the first reason, for multinational enterprises, the Act’s transparency
clause adds little, if anything, to their existing statutory disclosure duties. The California Act
already covers some companies that gave evidence such as IKEA while others operate CSR
programs for reputational reasons. In essence, for both types of companies, the ‘light touch’
requirements of the Modern Slavery Act means that they can continue with ‘business as usu-
al’. The vagueness of the Act means that these companies can either use the reporting that
they already do in accordance with the California Act or re-purpose boilerplate CSR state-
ments. The problem with this minimalist and vague transparency clause is that it effectively
gives a statutory backing to generic and promotional CSR reporting which, so far, has not
achieved much in terms of eradicating forced labour by suppliers. Despite all the rhetoric
about leading the fight against slavery, in legal terms, the actual outcome is purely a statu-
tory reference to private governance reporting without any binding requirements or
sanctions.
Secondly, it can be argued that the business support among multinational enterprises for
transparency is based on the realization that more stringent public regulation such as a crim-
inal offence would have resulted in an increased risk of liability. Now these companies hope
to gain some positive publicity by collaborating and demonstrating commitment to ‘trans-
parent and sustainable supply chains’ while they, in reality, have strategically deflected
stronger binding legislative duties. The repeated warning of companies that regulation
should not be too burdensome is a phrase that the government readily adopted.49 Criminal
liability would have not only been a liability risk, but also a reputational concern, which
explains why the multinational enterprises were happy to support transparency reporting
while they rejected liability modelled on the Bribery Act. Legally, there is a significant differ-
ence between the compliance required by reporting and the Bribery Act. Whereas the former
is usually met by boilerplate statements and codes of conduct, the latter would have trig-
gered a sophisticated due diligence programme in order to qualify for the defense of
48 Interview with David Arkless, London, March 2012. See also written evidence from IKEA (Q1155),
which notes, ‘The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act applies to IKEA as we have opera-
tions in California . . . We support efforts to raise the issues of slavery and human trafficking among
companies. The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act has successfully raised the impor-
tance of tackling the issues.’
49 See written evidence from Amazon and IKEA and oral evidence from representative of Tesco,
Sainsbury’s and Primark (Q1155). For the government position see oral evidence by Karen Bradley,
Minister for Modern Slavery and Organized Crime (Q1346) who said: ‘What I want to get to, though,
is something that does actually stop the bad businesses – not unnecessarily burden those that are
already doing the right thing.’
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‘adequate procedures’. Given repeated reports about slavery in global supply chains, those
internationally operating firms would have had much work to do in order to comply with
due diligence requirements. It is therefore hardly a surprise that they supported reporting
duties that effectively legally back their existing private governance regime on supply chains
which is usually based on a supplier code of conduct with some monitoring and little
enforcement and which usually only affects first-tier suppliers.
Thirdly, the private governance regime of CSR in supply chains is—though ineffective—
still a cost factor for the companies concerned. A further reason for the support for supply
chain transparency by multinational enterprises can therefore also be found in the fact that
they wish to create a ‘level playing field’ with other business actors such as firms with a
domestic supply chain that, so far, did not operate similar supply chain transparency
reporting.
It seems as if the government sought to justify the light-touch approach of its regulation
by putting it into the context of its implementation of the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (UK Home Office 2015, Annex D). The UN Guiding Principles
are a standard on business and human rights which was endorsed by the UN Human Rights
Council in 2011.50 The Principles do not impose any legal obligations onto companies, but
elaborate the implications of existing standards and practices for states and businesses
(Ruggie, 2011a, para 14). John Ruggie, who developed the Principles during his mandate as
UN Special Representative, explains that he is a ‘pragmatist’ who wanted to ‘achieve the
maximum reduction in corporate-related human rights harm in the shortest possible period
of time’ (Ruggie 2011b, p. 1). While, at first sight, the transparency clause in the Modern
Slavery Act could be regarded as being inspired by the Principles as a consensual, pragmatic
piece of legislation, this view does not stand up to scrutiny for two main reasons. First, com-
panies are currently not duty-bearers in international law, so an imposition of human rights
obligations on companies in the Guiding Principles would have required a change of existing
legal principles. In contrast, the more stringent legislative options for the Modern Slavery
Act would have all been modelled on existing laws. Secondly, while it is true that the
Guiding Principles, inter alia, emphasize the importance of business communication ( (UN
Human Rights Council, 2011) Principle 3), i.e. information disclosure, the UK government
expressly refers to the Bribery Act as an example of its ‘existing legal and policy framework’
in its National Action Plan on the implementation of the Guiding Principles. This again
shows that a more stringent legislation in the Modern Slavery Act would have fit equally
well into its existing framework of business regulation.
In short, the multinational-led coalition and the government coalesced around transpar-
ency legislation, as both sides could demonstrate some commitment to combatting slavery in
supply chains while avoiding meaningful mandatory regulation and liability that would
have forced companies to do more than they currently do. Other factors—such as ideology
and limited enforcement budgets—no doubt also shaped the legislation; however, these fell
outside of the limits of our research for this particular article and did not come up in our
dataset. The repeated intention by both parties not to create an extra ‘burden’ was achieved
by settling on a compromise that meant that the least stringent, privately led initiative was
chosen. The compromise reached is more or less a continuation of the business-driven
50 The Guiding Principles are intended to be implemented by states and companies. The UK published
its National Action Plan in 2013, see HM Government (September 2013).
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voluntary status quo for multinational enterprises. It is a weak compromise that will often
only require a copy and paste job regarding the statements about the supply chain in the
companies’ CSR/Sustainability reports. The risk of liability is almost non-existent and com-
panies will find the compliance requirements easy to meet. Companies have therefore suc-
cessfully avoided mandatory liability for forced labour in their supply chain through
complex political strategies, which have included ‘volunteering’ to accept public regulation
which is, in fact, private governance in disguise.
6.4 The failure of business to disrupt the legislative process in the Bribery Act
In this section of the article, we have argued that corporate actors and private initiatives dis-
rupted the coalition to spread public anti-slavery legislation. This was not inevitable, and
indeed, there are several examples of where governments have opted for stringent legislative
approaches, even in the face of business pressure. In this section, we provide a brief compari-
son to the legislative process leading to the UK Bribery Act. In contrast to the Modern
Slavery Act, in the case of the Bribery Act, the government eventually opted for a more strin-
gent variant of its original proposal. Our analysis points to some notable differences
between the policymaking processes that led to two Acts, which further underscore the sig-
nificance of the strategic use of private governance by a business coalition to deflect more
stringent legislation.
In the case of the Bribery Act, the background to the legislation was the need to reform
the law in this area, combined with international initiatives and pressures. For example, the
OECD had put pressure on the UK to update its law in this area (OECD Working Group on
Bribery, United Kingdom, 2008, p. 25). In 2008, at the beginning of the legislative process,
the Law Commission (a statutory independent body in the UK that reviews the law and
makes recommendations for reform) published a report in which it recommended the intro-
duction of statutory criminal liability for corporations in the Bribery Act (Law Commission,
2008, Part 6). The government followed the Law Commission’s recommendation in its draft
legislation (March 2009). It included a new corporate criminal offence for the failure of
commercial organisations to prevent bribery. The reports of the Joint Committee on the
Draft Bribery Bill show that no private alternatives were discussed in the legislative process,
but that business representatives criticized the draft offence (Joint Committee, 2009a,
p. 31–39). The discussion focussed on legal issues of the offence, in particular, whether or
not it should include a requirement of ‘negligence’ or ‘gross negligence’. For example,
Andrew Berkeley from the International Chamber of Commerce called the proposal a ‘dra-
conian standard’ and Gary Campkin from the Confederation of British Industry criticized
that the offence was too strict as it was based on the failure of organisations to prevent brib-
ery rather than a requirement ‘to do your best to hinder it’ (Joint Committee, 2009b: Q178).
However, despite these criticisms from the business side, the Joint Committee finally decided
to recommend a version of the offence that was more stringent than in the draft bill. The
government adopted this recommendation (UK Government, 2009, p. 7–8). The offence
that became law was strict liability coupled with a defence of adequate procedures without
the need to prove negligence for a conviction as in the draft bill (Joint Committee, 2009a,
p. 35). This outcome shows that the corporate actors failed to weaken the initial proposal
with their concerns and even ended up facing a stricter law than was initially discussed. It is
remarkable that, in the end, a more stringent offence became law and that the interventions
of the business representatives were futile.
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This brief and cursory account of the legislative processes that led to the Bribery Act
highlights some important features of our case study of the Modern Slavery Act. First, dur-
ing the Bribery Act process, there was no viable private governance alternative advocated by
business representatives. It appears that they primarily focused on changing the proposed
offence in the draft bill through their evidence to the Joint Committee, but they did not argue
for a less stringent private alternative. Thus, the debate was about variations of the proposed
offence for bribery rather different legislative options as in the Modern Slavery Act.
Secondly, there is no evidence of a strategic coalition in the Bribery case that would be com-
parable to what we find in the Modern Slavery Act. Thirdly, a final important difference is
that, in the Bribery Act, the Joint Committee seems to have relied significantly on academic
evidence for its recommended more stringent draft of the offence. It seems that particularly
in the absence of a private alternative and the lack of a strategic coalition, the business influ-
ences did not gain the necessary traction to steer the regulatory process.
A final point to consider in our analysis of the comparative legislative processes leading
to the Modern Slavery Act and Bribery Act is that different governments were in place at the
time when the two acts were passed. Labour led the government when the Bribery Act
received royal assent whereas the Conservative–Liberal Democrats coalition government
was in power when the Modern Slavery Act received royal assent. One could see the centre-
left Labour government as a possible explanation for the more stringent regulatory outcome
in the case of the Bribery Act and, likewise, the Conservative-led government with its dereg-
ulatory, pro-business approach as the reason for the less stringent regulation in the Modern
Slavery Act. However, in our view, the difference in government does not constitute a suffi-
cient explanation, given the Labour government’s well-documented wave of neo-liberal eco-
nomic policies. It is beyond the scope of this article to fully engage with the ideology of New
Labour and, in particular, its economic policies and its approach to business regulation, but
these have been extensively documented elsewhere (see, for example, Griffiths and Hickson,
2010). However, for the purpose of this article, it is important to note that the Labour gov-
ernments under both Tony Blair (1997–2007) and Brown (2007–2010) were ‘pro-business,
pro-enterprise and pro-market’ (Gamble, 2010, p. 648). Their laissez-faire approach to the
regulation of financial markets was even called a ‘Faustian Pact’ (Elliott, 2008). Generally,
the Labour government’s forging of links with businesses represented ‘a major shift of pre-
vious Labour governments’ (Shaw, 2012). New Labour was ‘influenced by Thatcherism,
explicitly rejected the traditional ethos of British social democracy’ (Diamond, 2011). In
fact, some academic commentators view the policies adopted by the New Labour govern-
ment as a continuation of those adopted by the previous Conservative governments
(Hefferman, 2001). We therefore argue that, given the neo-liberal approach towards busi-
ness and business regulation of the Labour governments, the fact that Labour was in power
during the passing of the Bribery Act does not itself explain the more stringent regulatory
outcome.
7. Conclusion
After nearly two decades of activist pressure on governments to strengthen systems and ini-
tiatives to detect and address forced labour and slavery, the business of forced labour contin-
ues to be insufficiently regulated. Our research has elucidated the role of industry actors in
creating and maintaining the governance gaps that allow labour abuse to thrive, as they
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have championed private, industry-led mechanisms and sought to deflect alternative regula-
tory tools with greater stringency. Conceptually, we have highlighted that the mechanisms
through which private displacement of public regulation occurs are far more variegated than
have been emphasized in the existing literature, and have argued that there is a need for
greater attention to the political agency of business in debates about public and private regu-
latory interactions. In particular, we have argued that there is a need to be attentive to the
role of industry–NGO partnerships and collaborations in influencing the stringency of pub-
lic regulatory initiatives.
The result of these competing pressures is a highly uneven wave of national legislation.
At worst, this legislation does little to raise public standards and reinforces the status quo by
codifying existing private governance approaches. As one candid corporate representative
described the situation, ‘There’s a lot of unwarranted excitement around transparency.
Every company has slavery in their supply chain—anyone who says they don’t is lying or
incompetent. But at the moment, suppliers are keeping the customer happy with low costs,
auditors are making lots of money, and companies have plausible deniability. Transparency
legislation won’t do anything to change that.’51
A great deal of further research will be required to understand precisely how far and in
what ways the strategic mobilization of private governance might be impacting the strin-
gency of reflexive regulation to bolster labour standards, and to understand the displace-
ment effects that may be occurring as private actors seek to undercut efforts to strengthen
public governance of labour in global supply chains. But our research suggests that—in the
case of the Modern Slavery Bill—there was a coalition in place to ‘ratchet up’ public stand-
ards by strengthening governance mechanisms to detect and address forced labour, but this
was ultimately disrupted by the emergence of a private alternative.
Significantly, the dynamics at play in the bargaining process leading up to new anti-
slavery legislation cannot be reduced to simple ‘regulatory capture’ (Stigler, 1971), existing
theories on lobbying and advocacy, or the default assumption that corporations will resist
and seek to thwart all new regulation. Rather than merely capturing the state, corporate
actors attempted also to sway NGOs and seize on the momentum that societal forces have
generated over the last decade to pass legislation that does little more than bolster the status
quo. While there is a longstanding assumption within the literature that corporations will
resist government regulation, in this scenario, a coalition of multinational enterprises was
actively pushing for government regulation, and their resistance took on a much more subtle
and contradictory form than is anticipated by many strands of the literature. Furthermore,
the coalition ultimately responsible for the Modern Slavery Bill blurs many of the lines that
scholars have typically drawn between government, business and NGOs. Such dynamics,
and their consequences for the persistence of forced labour in national economies, surely
warrant further investigation.
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